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Broker-Purchaser Relationships
I. INTRODUCTION
In the well publicized case of Easton v. Strassburger,' a California
Court of Appeal held that a listing agent2 has a duty to conduct a rea-
sonably competent inspection of residential property listed for sale,
and to disclose to prospective purchasers all material facts that such
an investigation would reveal. The doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility further emphasizes the importance of Easton. Although the
broker in Easton was held to be only five percent negligent, he was
held liable for the entire amount of the damages awarded by the jury
because of the doctrine of joint and several liability.3
In light of the ambiguity and far-reaching effects of Easton,4 the
legislature responded with Senate Bills 453 and 1406, which clarify
and limit the Easton holding. The first part of this comment will sur-
vey the development of broker liability in residential real estate sales
and will then conclude with an examination of Easton's impact on
broker liability. The second part will examine both senate bills and
their applicability in avoiding Easton liability. Finally, this comment
will discuss the impact of joint and several liability on the court's
ruling.
II. FACTS
In May of 1976, Leticia and Gerald Easton purchased a one acre
parcel of residential property for $170,000 from Bill and Faith Strass-
1. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
2. "[A] listing broker, also called the seller's broker, has a contractual relation-
ship with the vendor." Comment, Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage:
Conflict of Interest and Interest in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 379, 381 n.10
(1982). In this paper, the terms broker and agent will be used interchangeably.
3. See Gillies, Broker Liability and E & 0 Costs Are Major Concerns for Realtors,
CAL. REAL. EsT., Jan. 1986, at 18, 19.
4. Because of the possible widespread effect of Easton, "It]he California Associa-
tion of Realtors, the National Association of Realtors, Merrill Lynch Realty Associ-
ates, the Arizona Association of Realtors, the Texas Association of Realtors, and the
Hawaii Association of Realtors filed amicus briefs." Caron, Easton v. Strassburger: A
New Era of Broker Litigation, 3 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 1, 2 (1985). Furthermore, the
holding has been extended outside the real estate realm and applied to travel agents.
See McCollum v. Friendly Hills, 172 Cal. App. 3d 83, 217 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1985).
burger, unaware that a portion of the property had been built on a
landfill. Shortly after the close of escrow in July, there Was a mas-
sive landslide which caused the foundation of the house to settle,
cracked the walls, and warped the doorways of the house. According
to expert testimony, the slides were caused by improper engineering
and compacting of the soil. As a result of the slide, the value of the
property was estimated to be as low as $20,000 and estimates for the
cost of repair were as high as $213,000.
Agents of Valley Realty represented the Strassburgers, the defend-
ant-sellers, in listing the home for sale through the Multiple Listing
Service. Agents of Mason McDuffie represented the Eastons as the
plaintiff-purchasers. It is uncontested that there was prior landslide
activity on the property that was concealed from Valley Realty by
the Strassburgers. However, there is also evidence that agents of
Valley Realty had conducted several inspections of the property and
were aware of certain "red flags" indicating soil problems. But de-
spite these "red flags," the agents did not have the soil tested for sta-
bility and also failed to warn the purchasers of any potential soil
problems.
The Eastons brought suit against the Strassburgers, Valley Realty,5
and three other named defendants.6 The jury returned a special ver-
dict for $197,000 based on simple negligence. Under comparative neg-
ligence principles, the negligence was apportioned as follows: sixty-
five percent against the seller, twenty-five percent against the build-
ers, five percent against Valley Realty, and five percent against Ma-
son-McDuffie, a non-party. Valley Realty appealed, arguing that the
jury instruction which stated that a real estate agent was under a
duty to investigate and disclose material facts affecting the property
was incorrect.
On February 22, 1984, the First District, Division Two of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal, upheld the lower court's decision. It created
a new duty running from the seller's agent to the purchaser and held
"that the duty of a real estate broker, representing the seller, to dis-
close facts . . .includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably
competent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed
for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially
affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an inves-
5. Valley Realty was originally charged with intentional misrepresentation, negli-
gent misrepresentation, and concealment. Caron, supra note 4, at 1. During the trial,
all causes of action were voluntarily dismissed except for negligent misrepresentation,
and the court also permitted the plaintiff to submit a jury instruction based on simple
negligence. Id.
6. These defendants, San Ramon Builders, George Sauer, and H.M. Bull, were
being sued solely for negligent construction. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d
90, 97, 199 Cal. Rptr., 383, 386 (1984).
(Vol. 14: 667, 1987] Negligence in Real Estate
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tigation would reveal."7
On April 2, i984, a petition for hearing was filed with the Califor-
nia Supreme Court by Valley Realty.8 In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme
Court refused to hear the case.9
III. EXPANDING BROKER LIABILITY
At common law, real estate sales were judged by the doctrine of
caveat emptor,lO and relief was afforded to purchasers only on the
basis of fraud or deceit." Slowly, courts began to move away from
this antiquated doctrine and began to protect the "innocent" pur-
chaser. Presently, we are in a "growing era of consumerism," 12 and
courts are affording the residential home purchaser, in what may
well turn out to be the single largest purchase of his life, greater pro-
tection by increasing the duty real estate brokers owe to him.13
In today's market, real estate agents are licensed professionals who
are held in a position of trust by home purchasers. 14 In a nationwide
study commissioned by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
discrepancy between purchaser expectation of the purchaser-broker
fiduciary relationship and the current status of the law was re-
7. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
8. Caron, supra note 4, at 2.
9. Id.
10. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-72, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 707-08 (1974) ("Uinder traditional common law rules, the landlord owed no
duty to place leased premises in a habitable condition and no obligation to repair .
.. "). See also Sanders v. Stevens, 23 Ariz. 370, 376, 203 P. 1083, 1085 (1922) (false rep-
resentations as to the lowest price that the seller will accept does not give rise to an
action for fraud). Caveat emptor is literally defined as "1]et the buyer beware."
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
11. See inkfra notes 39-57.
12. Jacobson, Broker's Liability for Sale of Defective Homes: The Decline of Ca-
veat Emptor, 52 L.A.B.J. 346, 353 (1977). See also Tennant v. Lawton, 26 Wash. App.
701, 706, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309-10 (1980) (a broker has a duty to take reasonable steps to
avoid disseminating false information to the buyer and to confirm or refute material
facts of which he is aware). See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Re-
alty-Recent Assault Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); McNall & Vincent,
Caveat Venditor Comes of Age In Alaska-A Plaintiff's Guide to Defective Home Liti-
gation, 11 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 57 (1981); Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEx.
L. REV. 439 (1960).
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
14. See Sawyer Realty v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 385-86, 432 N.E.2d 849, 851-52
(1982) cited in Peterson, Tort Claims by Real Estate Purchasers Against Sellers and
Brokers: Current Illinois Common Law and Statutory Strategies, 1983 S. ILL. U.L.J.
161, 176-77 (1983) (brokers occupy a position of trust with the purchasers with whom
they are dealing and that this does not undermine the fiduciary duty from broker to
seller).
vealed.15 Fifty-seven percent of the purchasers polled felt that the
listing agent with whom they dealt represented their interests.16
When two brokers were involved in the transaction, a listing agent
and a cooperating broker,17 over seventy percent of the purchasers
polled believed that the cooperating broker represented them.1s
The study further revealed three distinct problems that the pur-
chaser faces: "'non-disclosure to the buyer of the broker's position,
under-representation, and lack of legal responsibility of the broker to
the buyer.' "19 In order to rectify these problems, courts have im-
posed liability on real estate agents by creating implied agencies be-
tween the real estate broker and the purchaser,20 and by expanding
the duties that brokers owe to those purchasers.21 In California, the
pinnacle in home buyer protection was reached when Easton was
decided.22
A. Agency Requirements and Fiduciary Duties
As stated above, courts have begun to impose broker-purchaser lia-
bility via principles of agency and fiduciary duties. Easton continued
this trend in California by requiring listing agents to conduct a com-
petent inspection of residential property listed for sale and to disclose
to prospective purchasers all material facts that would affect the sale.
As such, it is necessary to discuss both agency relationships and fidu-
ciary duties.
1. Agency
The noncontractual rights and liabilities of a real estate broker are
governed by the Real Estate Commission, by the duty of care im-
15. Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An Examination of Cur-
rent Industry Standards and Practices, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 145, 155-56 (1984) (cit-
ing B. BROWN & E. GREEN, THE ROLE OF THE BROKER IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 3 (1979) ("Report to the FTC on the status of agency law as it affects
the role of residential real estate brokers")).
16. Comment, supra note 15, at 157-58 (citing B. BROWN & E. GREEN, supra note
15, at buyer questions 46a, 46b)).
17. In a real estate transaction, a "cooperating broker brings a prospective buyer
to the seller in expectation of sharing the commission if a sale is consummated." Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 381 n.10. The broker's fiduciary obligations lie with the seller
and not the purchaser. Id. at 385 n.35.
18. Comment, supra note 15, at 157-58 (citing B. BROWN & E. GREEN, supra note
15, at buyer questions 46a, 46b)).
19. Comment, supra note 15 at 155-56 (quoting B. BROWN & E. GREEN, supra note
15, at 3).
20. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 176-77.
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. California courts have been among those taking the lead in imposing duties on
sellers and brokers to disclose material facts relevant to a real estate transaction. See
Freyfogle, Real Estate Sales and the New Implied Warranty of Lawful Use, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 25-27 (1985).
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posed on licensed experts, and by the general principals of agency.23
In order for an agency relationship to arise, one person, the agent,
must agree with another, the principal, to represent him in dealings
with third parties. 24 This agreement may be either written or oral,
and it may arise by implication of the law.25 Moreover, little or no
formal requirements are needed to create an agency relationship and,
as such, conduct of the parties is sufficient to establish the principal-
agent relationship. 26
Once an agency relationship is established, the fiduciary duty that
is owed by the agent to the principal is that of honesty, loyalty, and
due care.27 Further, courts now seem willing to go a step further and
dispose of the agency requirement altogether if it will work an injus-
tice on a residential home purchaser.28 This trend places real estate
23. See Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 35, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 676 (1978); see
also T. GORDON, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW 234 (1980); see generally H. MILLER &
M. STARR, 1 CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 4:4 (rev. ed. 1975); W. SEA-
VEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 234-57 (1964).
24. See T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 228; REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALI-
FORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, REAL ESTATE BROKER PRACTICE 86
(1981) [hereinafter REGENTS]; Comment, supra note 2, at 384. See generally CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2295 (West 1985).
25. "An ostensible agency (an agency implied by law) may arise when the princi-
pal negligently or intentionally causes a third person reasonably to believe that an-
other is his agent. In this situation.., the law prevents.., the principal from denying
the creation of an agency relationship." T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 229. See Skopp
v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 432, 439, 546 P.2d 307, 312, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1976) (an express
statement is not essential to give rise to an agency agreement); Bealer v. West Am.
Fin. Co. 201 Cal. App. 2d 702, 20 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1962) (a broker's duty of confidential-
ity to the seller begins before the execution of the listing agreement). See generally
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2300 (West 1985).
26. An agency relationship may be created by an oral agreement and does not fall
within the statute of frauds. REGENTS, supra note 24, at 86-87.
27. See Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 441 P.2d 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1968); 3
D. AUGUSTINE & S. ZARROW, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE § (MB) 61.04
(1985). See generally Currier, Finding The Broker's Place in The Typical Residential
Real Estate Transaction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 655 (1981).
A real estate broker's duty to his seller corresponds to the duty a trustee owes a ben-
eficiary. See, e.g., Smith v. Zak, 20 Cal. App. 3d 785, 98 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1971); Loughlin
v. Idora Realty Co., 259 Cal. App. 2d 619, 66 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1968); Sands v. Eagle Oil &
Refining Co., 83 Cal. App. 2d 312, 188 P.2d 782 (1948); Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 50, 172 P.2d 533 (1946). When good faith is called into question, there is a re-
buttable presumption against the agent. Pepper v. Underwood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698,
715, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343, 356 (1975) (citing Timmsen v. Olsen, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860,
871, 86 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366 (1970)).
28. Comment, supra note 15, at 157, 168 (courts have been willing to impose a duty
of "honesty and good faith" on brokers toward purchasers, even in the absence of a
fiduciary relationship on the basis of "public policy."). See also Note, Theories of Real
Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIz. L. REV.
767 (1978).
agents in a dilemma. With increasing broker liability to purchasers,
do brokers owe a fiduciary duty to the seller or the purchaser?
Generally, the broker is held to be the agent of the first person
who employs him, usually the seller.29 Nonetheless, a broker may
unknowingly become the agent for the adverse party.30 For example,
in Wright v. Lowe,31 the real estate broker was held to be the pur-
chaser's agent with regard to the conveyance of a counteroffer. In
Whiteman v. Leonard,3 2 the purchaser's agent became the seller's
agent for the purpose of conveying escrow instructions. These cases
illustrate the juxtaposition with which a broker is faced. In order to
correct this problem, real estate law and general agency principles
have held that a broker must act "fairly and honestly with all par-
ties" involved in the transaction.3 3
As can be seen from the above examples, the delineation of those
to whom the real estate broker owes a duty, the buyer or the seller is
now, more than ever, clouded with ambiguity. Furthermore, given
the fact that today's courts are upholding actions brought by purchas-
ers against listing agents even in the absence of a principal-agent re-
lationship,34 the extent to which a real estate broker must act "fairly
and honestly" with home purchasers has become the focal point that
governs liability.35 Therefore, it is necessary to examine the duty
that a real estate agent now owes to a prospective purchaser.
2. Duty of Care
Inherent in a fiduciary relationship is the understanding that an
agent may not gain a financial advantage over his principal through
fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. 36 Because the fiduciary
bonds between the listing agent and the seller now extend to the pur-
chaser, these same principles have been carried into the scope of the
listing agent-purchaser relationship. Modernly, a broker violates his
duty of "good faith and honesty" toward the buyer not only if he
29. Wolf v. Price, 244 Cal. App. 2d 165, 173, 52 Cal. Rptr. 889, 894 (1966).
30. T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 231.
31. 140 Cal. App. 2d 891, 896-97, 296 P.2d 34, 37 (1956).
32. 189 Cal. App. 2d 373, 376-77, 11 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 (1961).
33. T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 236.
34. See Peterson, supra note 14, at 161.
35. In Illinois, the "critical issue of duty to nonclient plaintiffs has apparently
been resolved." Id. at 176. There, "[ifn Sawyer Realty v. Jarvis Corp.[,] the court re-
jected an argument that in the absence of a fiduciary relationship of principal and
agent, brokers have no obligation to disclose material facts to purchasers with whom
they are negotiating." Id. at 176-77 (citing Sawyer Realty v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379,
432 N.E.2d 849 (1982)). In fact, it can be argued that some if not all of the broker's
commission comes from the purchase price paid by the buyer. This should, in turn,
logically give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Nonetheless, courts rarely adopt this rea-
soning. See Comment, supra note 15, at 155.
36. Comment, supra note 2, at 384.
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fraudulently induces the third party into making the purchase, but
also if he negligently misrepresents facts material to the transac-
tion.3 7 And with the burgeoning of Easton, a broker faces liability
based on simple negligence.3 8 As such, an overview of the doctrines
of fraud and negligence will be presented.
a. Fraud
A fraudulent act is one that is intended to deceive another.39
Within this sphere are nondisclosures, concealments, and misrepre-
sentations of material facts.40 Moreover, fraud has grown to encom-
pass negligent misrepresentations as well.
Nondisclosure and concealments are very similar in nature and
often liability can be based on either of the two doctrines. A nondis-
closure is the failure to reveal material facts in the absence of affirm-
ative concealment. 41 For example, in Lingsch v. Savage,42 the court
held that when a broker possesses knowledge of material facts affect-
ing the desirability of property, he is under an affirmative duty to
disclose them to the purchaser unless they are readily apparent to
the purchaser.43 Moreover, a broker is obligated to disclose any
fraudulent acts by his principal.44
A concealment, on the other hand, is the affirmative act of hiding
defects to prevent their discovery.45 However, what comprises an af-
37. H. DAVEY & H. MERCER, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES IN CALIFORNIA 94 (1981).
38. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. For cases that have
arisen as a result of Easton, see inqfra text accompanying notes 94-99.
39. T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 236.
40. Id.
41. State v. Watson, 145 Kan. 792, 794, 67 P.2d 515, 517 (1937).
42. 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
43. Id. at 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205. See also Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860,
866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) (broker has a duty to disclose material facts affecting
the value of the property). The most common example of nondisclosure is the failure
to disclose termite problems. See, e.g., Maples v. Porath, 638 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963).
44. Willig v. Gold, 75 Cal. App. 2d 809, 171 P.2d 754 (1946). See also Williams v.
Benson, 3 Mich. App. 9, 141 N.W.2d 650, 656 (1966) cited in Barnhouse v. City of Pi-
nole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 190, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 892 (1982) ("Purchasers of a motel
who had been advised by [the] vendor that there had been termite infestation but [it
was] considered [that the] trouble had been remedied by treatment had a duty to dis-
close [these] facts to subpurchaser, and silence constituted fraud").
When a broker violates his duty, his liability is coextensive with the seller. Each
will be jointly and severally liable for the nondisclosure. See REGENTS, supra note 24,
at 112. For a further discussion of the doctrine of joint and several liability and its im-
plications on real estate transactions, see infra text part V and notes 114-28.
45. T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 237. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710 (West
1985). See Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 2d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). Cf Merrill v.
firmative act is not exactly clear. Nonetheless, it has been held that
the mere nondisclosure of structural defects is sufficient for liabil-
ity.46 Furthermore, as with nondisclosures, the broker is under an af-
firmative duty to disclose the fraudulent acts of the seller.47
Therefore, any concealment of a material fact may result in liability.
Broker liability to purchasers may also be based on the theory of
misrepresentation. Misrepresentations can take on two forms, inten-
tional or negligent. "An intentional misrepresentation is an affirma-
tive . . . statement of a material fact that the broker knows is
untrue."48 In Oakes v. McCarthy,49 a broker was never told to with-
hold information as to the existence of fills or drainage problems on
the land, and was further affirmatively instructed to make disclo-
sures to anyone who asked.5 0 Nonetheless, as to those who did not
ask, the broker saw no reason to tell them, and further made repre-
sentations that the house was constructed in compliance with Federal
Housing Authority requirements and had passed FHA inspection.5 1
The court held that the evidence supported a claim for misrepresen-
tation and fraudulent concealment.5 2 It reasoned that an inexperi-
enced purchaser could rely on the representations of an experienced
real estate agent.5 3
Finally, a claim for fraud may also be based on a negligent misrep-
resentation even though the statement was not made with an intent
to deceive.54 A negligent misrepresentation is a false statement by
one believing the statement to be true but who had no reasonable
grounds for such belief.5 5 In Stone v. Farnell,s6 the Ninth Circuit
Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 562, 375 P.2d 304, 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462 (1962) (stating that a
real estate agent who undertakes to show a house for the purpose of renting it is under
a duty to warn the lessee of concealed danger on the premises of which he is aware.)
See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710 (West 1985).
46. Cooper, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
47. See Willig v. Gold, 75 Cal. App. 2d 809, 171 P.2d 754 (1946).
48. T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 237. See generally CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1572, 1710
(West 1985).
49. 267 Cal. App. 2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1968).
50. Id. at 242, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
51. Id. at 260, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
52. Id. at 261, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
53. Id. In order to determine whether a misrepresentation occurred, considerable
weight should be given to the level of experience the purchaser has in real estate
transactions. Feckenscher v. Gamble, 12 Cal. 2d 482, 496, 85 P.2d 885, 891 (1938).
Moreover, although puffing-a statement of opinion on which a reasonable buyer
would not rely-has traditionally not been actionable, in today's trend of broker liabil-
ity, an agent should be extremely cautious of any affirmative statements he makes, un-
less they clearly constitute puffing. For example, "This is the best buy in town." See
Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865-66, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726-27 (1976) (state-
ments which are clearly opinion cannot constitute actionable fraud); see generally T.
GORDON, supra note 23, at 237.
54. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
55. Robert v. Ball, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976); see generally CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1572, 1710 (West 1985).
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Court of Appeals held that under California law a cause of action for
fraud would lie even in the absence of an intent to deceive-scien-
ter-so long as there were no reasonable grounds for making the
statement.5 7 As such, a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion is firmly established in California real estate law, and any repre-
sentation which is based on fraud will be actionable.
b. Negligence
As concern for buyer protection in residential real estate transac-
tions grows, courts are now beginning to open the door to liability
based on negligence. It was on this theory that the court in Easton
rested its holding, and it is in accord with modern thinking which
holds that a member of the public should reasonably be able to rely
on the expertise of professional and semi-professional groups.58 With
this new doctrine now expanding into broker-purchaser relation-
ships, Easton is holding a sword of Damocles over brokers to make a
competent investigation of residential real estate prior to the sale.
Negligence can be defined as the lack of due care that a reasonable
person would exercise under similar circumstances.5 9 In Merrill v.
Buck,60 the California Supreme Court foreshadowed the birth of neg-
ligence in broker-purchaser relationships. There, the court held that
real estate agents who had undertaken to show a house to a potential
lessee were under a duty to warn her of any concealed dangers on
the property of which they were aware and which might be foreseen
to cause her injury if she rented the premises.61 Although the court
admitted that this case was "one without exact precedent," it felt that
it was reasonable to impose this duty on the brokers because they
showed the house in the regular course of their business and for the
purpose of earning a commission.62
As can be seen in Merrill, the focal point that determines the lia-
bility of a broker, under a negligence theory, depends upon the duty
56. 239 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1957).
57. Id. at 754.
58. Levine, Real Estate Malpractice: Areas of Liability, TRIAL, Jan. 1982, at 33.
Furthermore, because it is often difficult to recover from the seller and 'because the
real estate broker is highly visible, continues to be in business, and is easily reached by
service of process, he often becomes the eventual target of a lawsuit." Jacobson, supra
note 12, at 346.
59. McKay v. Hedger, 139 Cal. App. 266, 34 P.2d 221 (1934). See generally CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).
60. 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962).
61. Id. at 562, 375 P.2d at 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
62. Id.
the court is willing to impose on him. As such, the essential element
that must be proved in a negligence cause of action against an agent
is that of duty.
B. Easton Liability
Although Easton is the landmark case establishing negligence as a
basis for broker liability in California, the court failed to address
three issues upon which this new duty rests. These issues are as fol-
lows: the standard of care that an agent must possess, the scope of
the investigation, and any conflict of interest that this duty imposes
on the broker-seller fiduciary relationship.63 In order to clarify Eas-
ton's place in California real estate law, these issues will be discussed.
1. Duty of Care
In Easton v. Strassburger,64 the court articulated a new duty, run-
ning from the listing agent to the home purchaser, upon which a
cause of action for negligence can be maintained.65 The court held
that a listing agent has an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably
diligent inspection of the premises for sale and to disclose to the
buyer facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the prop-
erty.66 Moreover, this was the first California appellate case to im-
pose such a far-reaching duty on the listing agent to investigate and
disclose material facts which he should have known.67
The court in Easton found precedent for its holding in two differ-
ent areas of law. The court "drew an analogy between the real estate
action and two fraud cases, Cooper v. Jevne . . . and Lingsch v. Savage
. . . [which] require a broker to disclose defects he knows of but
which are unknown and unobservable to the buyer."68 In order to
extend these holdings, the court drew support from article 9 of the
Code of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors.6 9 It states
that "[t]he Realtor shall avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or
concealment of pertinent facts [, and that] he has an affirmative obli-
63. Caron, supra note 4, at 2.
64. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
65. Caron, supra note 4, at 2.
66. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The court went on to
state that where "the cause of action is for negligence, not fraud, it need not be alleged
or proved that the broker had actual knowledge of the material facts in issue nor that
such facts were accessible only to him or his principal and that he therefore had con-
structive knowledge thereof." Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
67. Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See also Galante, Court Widens Home Brokers'
Duty, 6 NAT'L L.J. 3, 3 (1984).
68. Galante, supra note 67, at 10 (citing Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963));
see Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
69. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
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gation to discover adverse factors that a reasonably competent and
diligent investigation would disclose." 70 Notwithstanding this ethical
standard, it can be argued that the decision rests simply on policy
considerations.
The policy justifications for holding a listing agent liable on a negli-
gence theory stem from the agent's position as a licensed expert who
is held to a professional standard of care. 71 It has been argued that a
member of the public should reasonably be allowed to rely on the
representations of a broker because of his position as a professional.7 2
Furthermore, the court stated that this increased duty was not oner-
ous because the listing agent is usually in the best position to provide
reliable information to the buyer, and because it is relatively easy for
him to comply with this new standard of care.73 However, the court
failed to recognize that a broker often relies on the seller to disclose
latent defects and that he is usually not "a licensed expert in any of
the structural components of... property."7 4 Nonetheless, when de-
termining upon whom a duty should rest, courts generally weigh the
factors in favor of an inexperienced consumer and against a licensed
professional.
The following example illustrates this point. Because a real estate
appraiser gathers, prepares, analyzes, and determines the value of
property, he is held to a professional standard of care and may be lia-
ble to the purchaser for negligently performing his duties.7 5 There
are also cases holding engineers, 7 6 architects,7 7 lawyers,78 and insur-
70. Caron, supra note 4, at 5 (citing National Assoc. of Realtors, Interpretations of
the Code of Ethics, art. 9 (7th ed. 1978)); Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 390-91.
71. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387. See also Tennant v. Law-
ton, 26 Wash. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305 (1980); Brady v. Carman, 179 Cal. App. 2d 63, 3
Cal. Rptr. 612 (1960); Richards Realty Co. v. Real Estate Comm'r, 144 Cal. App. 2d 357,
300 P.2d 893 (1956).
72. Levine, supra note 58, at 33.
73. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. See also Tennant, 26
Wash. App. at 706, 615 P.2d at 1309-10 (the broker "is in a unique position to verify
critical information given [to] him by the seller."). Further, the Easton court stated
that in a residential real estate transaction, the listing agent may inadvertently lead
the buyer to believe that he represents his interests. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (citing Sinclair, The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Pro-
spective Purchasers of Real Property in Illinois, 69 ILL. B. J. 260, 263-64 (1981)).
74. Caron, supra note 4, at 7.
75. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492 (Alaska 1973).
76. E.g., A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
77. Id.
78. Holland v. Lawless, 95 N.M. 490, 623 P.2d 1004 (1981).
ers79 liable to purchasers of real property. Therefore, holding a bro-
ker liable for negligence seems in accord with the duty owed by other
professional groups.
Finally, the court's decision to extend broker liability in Easton can
be summed up in the following statement:
If a broker were required to disclose only known defects, but not also those
that are reasonably discoverable, he would be shielded by his ignorance of
that which he holds himself out to know.... Such a construction would not
only reward the unskilled broker for his own incompetence, but might pro-
vide the unscrupulous broker the unilateral ability to protect himself at the
expense of the inexperienced and unwary who rely upon him.8 0
With this statement, the court firmly established broker liability in
California.
2. Scope of the Investigation
Justice Kline stated that where a cause of action is based on simple
negligence "the undisclosed material facts need not be either actually
known by the broker or accessible only to him or his principal." 8 ' As
such, the listing agent is required to disclose facts that are reasonably
discoverable through a diligent investigation. However, the court did
not precisely define the scope of the investigation. It did state that it
requires "something more than a casual visual inspection and a gen-
eral inquiry of the owners."8 2
Because the court did not adequately define the scope of a listing
agent's duty to conduct a diligent investigation, guidelines for an
agent to follow are difficult to ascertain. Even so, the court did state
that only material facts need be disclosed. Therefore, by discussing
what constitutes materiality in a residential real estate transaction,
guidelines for a broker to follow may be inferred.
In a real estate transaction, facts are material if they might influ-
ence the principal's decision to enter into a transaction.8 3 However,
facts are not considered material for purposes of disclosure if they
are known by the buyer or readily observable by him.84
79. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
80. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 (1984).
81. Id. at 99 n.3, 199 Cal. Rptr. 388 n.3 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 105, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392. See also Caron, supra note 4, at 2 (a listing
agent now has a duty to disclose facts that are reasonably discoverable).
83. T. GORDON, supra note 23, at 235. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 2020 (West
1985). Although the issue of materiality defined here is that of agent to principal, the
same definition should govern materiality when the relationship involved is listing
agent to purchaser.
84. See e.g., Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976)
(material facts must be disclosed only if they are not known to or within the diligent
observation of the buyer); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr.
201, 204 (1963) (facts not known or within the diligent attention of the buyer); Clauser
v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App. 2d, 453, 454, 112 P.2d 661, 662 (1941) (facts are material only
when apparent to the vendee).
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In Easton, the court adopted an expanded definition of materiality.
The court defined material facts as those "affecting the value or de-
sirability of the property."8 5 However, it did not limit its holding to
facts that are observable by the buyer because to hold otherwise
might reward an incompetent or unscrupulous broker at the expense
of an inexperienced purchaser.8 6
Although the court adopted an expanded definition of materiality,
it did limit its holding in three ways. First, the court acknowledged
that there will be cases where the defect is "so clearly apparent" that
the broker, as a matter of law, will not be accountable for failing to
disclose it.87 Second, the holding is limited to an "inspection of the
property for the purpose of disclosing present facts."8 8 Third, the
court will continue to allow a broker to seek indemnity against a
seller who affirmatively misrepresents his property.8 9
3. Conflict of Interest
Although the court recognized the need for home purchaser pro-
tection, it failed to address the obvious conflict of interest that a bro-
ker faces as the result of its holding. Perhaps the best example
illustrating the dilemma realtors are facing is described in the case of
Hobbs v. Eichler,90 which dealt with the conflict of interest facing se-
curities brokers. The court stated:
[T]his [case] is a classic example of the conflict of interest which exists in the
securities industry and is at the heart of the circumstances which resulted in
the 'hobbling' of Mrs. Hobbs. On the one hand, brokers act as investment ad-
visers to their clients. On the other hand, they are salespersons, dependent
upon their brokerage commissions for a livelihood. Commissions are received
only when customers engage in transactions....
"Under this compensation system few brokers are immune to the temptation
to consider their financial interest from time to time while they are advising
clients. Being at once a salesman and counselor is too much of a burden for
most mortals."9 1
Similar to the problem facing the "hobbling" of Mrs. Hobbs, real
85. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting trial court jury
instructions).
86. Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See also Galante, supra note 67 at 10.
87. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
88. Caron, supra note 4, at 4.
89. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 110-11, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 396. See also Caron, supra
note 4, at 6. Nonetheless, the seller may be judgment proof because he has reinvested
in another home, which will likely be homesteaded, or because he is beyond the sub-
poena power of the court. In such a situation, the broker will bear the burden of the
entire judgment. Jacobson, supra note 12, at 346.
90. 164 Cal. App. 3d 174, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985).
91. Id. at 204, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (citations omitted).
estate brokers are faced with inherent conflicts which arise in their
profession. In the 1980's, the issue of dual representation has become
one of the most critical problems facing real estate agents.92 And
with the holding in Easton, which creates a dual agency relationship
between the listing agent and the seller and the listing agent and the
purchaser in every residential real estate transaction, the problem of
dual representation facing the real estate industry is only being com-
pounded. Yet, the logic behind the holding can be easily extrapolated
from the case. In Easton, the court simply felt that the risks arising
out of dual agency relationships should be borne by the licensed real
estate agent and not by the inexperienced home purchaser.93
C. The Impact of Easton
The holding in Easton has caused a variety of problems for the real
estate industry-ranging from defining the new standard of care to
creating an inherent conflict of interest in every residential real es-
tate transaction. But beyond the issues discussed above, there are
other issues just as telling, that arise out of the case. First, the bro-
ker has traditionally relied on the seller for information regarding la-
tent defects in the property. With the advent of Easton, sellers may
now withhold information about their property for fear that any dis-
closure will result in a costly investigation. 94 Second, a broker over-
zealous in making disclosures to the buyer may face a suit by the
seller.95 Third, Easton may become a conduit for a variety of poten-
tial lawsuits. For example, "claims [which allege] 'material facts' that
a broker 'should have known' include: the presence of barking dogs
in the neighborhood at night; the blowing of the wind on a hilltop
... ; [and] the fact that a toilet bowl fills up with hot water rather
than cold water resulting in higher utility bills."96 Finally, because of
the tort principle of joint and several liability, a slightly negligent
broker is potentially liable for large damage awards.97
92. Comment, supra note 2, at 379 (citing 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW
OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 4:18 (Supp. 1981)). The problem of dual agency is par-
ticularly acute in the area of sub-agency relationships arising out of multiple listing
agreements. This is because the cooperating broker, who brings a prospective pur-
chaser to the seller, is actually a sub-agent of the listing broker and has the same fi-
nancial interest as the listing agent in closing the deal at a high price. Comment,
supra note 2, at 381 n.11, 387. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2349, 2351 (West 1985).
93. See Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389 ("[T]he broad defini-
tion of the duty we adopt is supported not simply by the magnitude of the benefit thus
conferred on buyers but also by the relative ease with which the burden can be sus-
tained by brokers."). See also Comment, supra note 2, at 404.
94. Caron, supra note 4, at 6.
95. Id. at 7.
96. Id. at 2.
97. For a discussion of the doctrine of joint and several liability in relation to Eas-
ton, see infra Part V and notes 114-28.
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Perhaps, the Easton court should have followed the decision in
Provost v. Miller,98 a case decided by the Supreme Court of Vermont.
In Provost, the plaintiff-purchasers brought suit against the seller
and the real estate broker for damages sustained to the house when
the wall of the basement collapsed shortly after the sale. At the
trial, the real estate broker was found guilty of negligent misrepre-
sentation. On appeal, the court agreed that the judge incorrectly in-
structed the jury on the broker's duty to make an independent
investigation for the purpose of verifying statements made by the
seller. The court held that the real estate broker was an agent of the
seller and that:
[A] ... broker or agent is guilty of negligent misrepresentation only if he or
she passes information from a seller to a buyer that he or she knows or has
reason to know may be untrue. Real estate brokers and agents are marketing
agents, not structural engineers or contractors. They have no duty to verify
independently representations made by a seller unless they are aware of facts
that "tend to indicate that such representation[s are] false."9 9
Nonetheless, the California Court of Appeal felt that greater pro-
tection was owed to the residential home buyer and created a cause
of action against a listing agent for simple negligence. But, because
of the undefined parameters of the holding, the California legislature
passed two bills, Senate Bills 453 and 1406, which help define and
limit Easton.
IV. HOW TO AVOID EASTON: SENATE BILLS 453 AND 1406
Because of the far-reaching effects of Easton, the California legisla-
ture responded by passing Senate Bills 453100 and 1406101 which de-
fine and limit the Easton holding. They are important guidelines as
98. 144 Vt. 67, 473 A.2d 1162 (1984).
99. Id. at 69-70, 473 A.2d at 1163-64 (citing Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 257, 259-60, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1979)) (emphasis added).
100. S. 453, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws §§ 1, 3-4 (codified as amended at CAL.
CIv. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1986) (duty to prospective purchaser of residential prop-
erty) and at CAL. INS. CODE § 11589.5 (West Supp. 1986) (professional insurer cannot
exclude coverage of Easton liability from its policy)). See generally Easton v. Strass-
burger: New Legislation Changes Broker's Duty, 1985 REAL EST. BuLL. 1 (Fall 1985).
101. S. 1406, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws §§ 1, 3 (codified as amended at CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176.5 (West Supp. 1986) and in Chapter 2, Title 4, Part 4, Divi-
sion 2 of the California Civil Code, relating to real property) (commissioner may inves-
tigate and suspend or revoke an agent's license for violation of this article) and at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1102 (West Supp. 1986) (disclosure requirements relating to the transfer of
residential property)). See generally Easton, Nash Bills Signed by Governor, News a la
Cal. A. Realtors, Oct. 25, 1985 at 1.
to the parameters of Easton liability and, as such, it is important that
brokers have a working knowledge of both bills.
A. Senate Bill 453
Senate Bill 453, which became effective January 1, 1986, was
drafted to clarify and limit a licensee's duty under Easton. It is appli-
cable to both listing agents and cooperating brokers and acknowl-
edges that real estate brokers are not structural engineers or soil
experts. Therefore, it imposes on them only "'the degree of care
that a reasonably prudent real estate licensee would exercise as mea-
sured by the knowledge, education, and experience necessary to ob-
tain a real estate license.' "102 Further, it imposes several limitations
on Easton.
First, in order for liability to arise under this article, the transac-
tion must involve a sale, lease-option, installment land contract, or a
ground lease coupled with improvements of residential real estate
comprising one to four dwelling units. Second, the scope of the in-
vestigation is limited solely to a visual inspection of the property and
to areas reasonably accessible to such an inspection. The scope of the
investigation is further limited to the unit offered for sale, and if the
property is a condominium, stock cooperative, or part of a planned
unit development, a broker's duty to inspect extends only to the unit
itself and not the entire complex.
The fourth area of Easton that the bill clarifies is the disclosure re-
quirement. Under Easton, a broker is required to disclose material
facts affecting the value or desirability ofv property whether or not
they are reasonably discoverable by the purchaser.'0 3 In this bill, the
legislature chose to limit disclosure to facts not known or within the
diligent observation of the purchaser and, as such, reinstated the pur-
chaser's obligation to use reasonable care to protect himself.104 Fi-
nally, the bill requires that a cause of action, based upon Easton,
must be brought within a two year period which begins to run from
the close of escrow, the date of recordation, or the date of occupancy,
whichever occurs first.105
102. Hutchinson, Legislative Response to Easton: Broker's Duty Exemplified, 1986
CAL. REAL EST. 14, 14 (quoting S. 453, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws § 2).
103. Easton, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
104. This limitation is logical because it returns the standard to that articulated in
the fraud cases of Lingsch and Cooper upon which the court in Easton based its hold-
ing. See id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
105. The bill also provides that a professional liability insurer may not exclude Eas-
ton liability from its coverage. S. 453, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws at 11589.5. How-
ever, this is only a partial solution to the problem and does not address the real issue,
the effect of Easton on insurance premiums. See generally Gillies, Broker Liability
and E & 0 Costs are Major Concerns for Realtors, 1986 CAL. REAL ESTATE 18 (1986).
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B. Senate Bill 1406
The legislature also passed a second piece of Easton legislation,
Senate Bill 1406, which became effective January 1, 1987.106 This bill
requires that the seller fill out a specified disclosure form which is
then to be verified through the broker's inspection. 107 The disclosure
form asks questions ranging from defects in appliances, utilities, and
structural components of the house to questions regarding easements,
encroachments, building code violations, nuisances or noise problems
in the neighborhood, lawsuits affecting the property and, as in Eas-
ton, landfills and soil problems.08 The result is that anytime there is
an inconsistency between the broker's observations and the question-
naire, a "red flag" rises warning brokers of potential Easton
liability.109
The bill further requires that all disclosures be made in good
faith,11o and it generally places upon the broker obtaining the offer
the responsibility of delivering the disclosure statement to the pro-
spective purchaser before title to the property is transferred."'
However, if the disclosure statement is delivered "after the execution
106. The one year delay is designed to give the public and the real estate industry
ample time to educate themselves and conform to the requirements of the bill. Hutch-
inson, supra note 102, at 14. See also Parker, Legislative Summary, REAL EsT. BuLL.
(official publication of the California Department of Real Estate) 1 (Winter 1985).
107. For a copy of the disclosure form, see infa appendix A.
108. However, this article does not apply to the following.
(a) Transfers which are required to be preceded by the furnishing . .. of a
public report.(b) Transfers pursuant to a court order.
(c) Transfers to a mortgagee by a mortgagor ....
(d) Transfers by a fiduciary in the course of the administration of a decedent's
estate, guardianship, conservatorship, or trust.
(e) Transfers from one co-owner to ... other co-owners.
(f) Transfers made to a spouse, or to a person in the lineal line of
consanguinity.
(g) Transfers between spouses resulting from a decree of [divorce] or... legal
separation or from a property settlement ....
(j) Transfers to or from any governmental entity.
S. 1406, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws at 1102.1.
109. The legislature adopted the position advanced by Martha L. Caron in her arti-
cle Easton v. Strassburger: A New Era of Broker Litigation. See Caron, supra note 4,
at 3.
110. "For the purposes of this article, 'good faith' means honesty in fact in the con-
duct of the transaction." S. 1406, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws at 1102.7.
111. However, if there is more than one broker involved in the transaction, the
transferor may shift the responsibility of delivering the disclosure statement away
from the selling broker. He may accomplish this by giving other written instructions
for delivery. Id. at 1102.12(a).
of [the] offer to purchase, the [purchaser] shall have three days after
delivery in person or five days after delivery by deposit in the mail,
to terminate his or her offer. ... 112
Under this bill, neither a seller nor an agent will be liable for er-
rors or omissions in the disclosure statement if the information given
was obtained by the use of ordinary care and the inaccuracy was not
known to either party. This bill also recognizes, as does Senate bill
453, that brokers are not experts in all areas of land transactions, and
it allows a broker to rely on an opinion or report prepared by a con-
tractor, land surveyor, geologist, structural pest controller, or other
similar expert without holding him liable for errors or omissions in
the report. Moreover, it holds that even if a person willfully or negli-
gently violates his duty under this article, the transaction will not be
invalidated. Nonetheless, he shall be liable for the actual damages
suffered by the purchaser.11 3
V. THE IMPACT OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON EASTON
"Easton simultaneously expanded exposure for .. .brokers who
failed to inspect, and focused realtor attention on the issue of joint
and several liability."114 Under this doctrine, persons who act either
jointly, concurrently, or successively to cause an indivisible harm are
each individually liable for the entire injury." 5 In Li v. Yellow Cab
Company,n1 6 the California Supreme Court adopted a "pure" compar-
ative negligence system "under which liability for damages [is] borne
by those whose negligence caused [the injury] in direct proportion to
their respective fault.""7 However, the court left open the issue of
whether joint and several liability would remain viable in Califor-
112. Id. at 1102.2.
113. For further information regarding senate bills 453 and 1406, members of the
California Association of Realtors may call the Legal Services Hotline at (213) 739-
8282. Hutchinson, supra note 102, at 16.
114. Gillies, supra note 3, at 18.
115. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 81, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 40, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979); Apodaca v. Haworth, 206 Cal. App. 2d 209, 213, 23 Cal. Rptr. 461,
463 (1962); Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 598, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (1960).
See also Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Law--An Analy-
sis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 360, 361 (1980); Zavos, Comparative Fault and
the Insolvent Defendant- A Critique and Amplification of American Motorcycle Asso-
ciation v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 775, 777 (1981). See generally W. KEA.
TON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 322-24 (5th ed. 1979).
116. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
117. Id. at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The court further stated that
"the contributory negligence of the person injured in person or property [does] not bar
recovery, but the damages awarded [are to] be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering." Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 875.
For a bibliography of articles discussing the principle of comparative negligence in
California, see Kunter, Bibliography: Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 33 DEF. L.J.
219, 238-39 (1984).
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nia.1 1 8 The court affirmatively answered this question in American
Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,1l9 where it reasoned that a
"'wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress.' "120
As such, joint and several liability remains a viable doctrine in this
state.12 1
However, "problems ... lurk in the background"12 2 of the court's
holding. Easton is such an example. Here, Valley Realty, while only
five percent negligent, was liable for the entire judgment because of
the insolvency of the other defendants.123
A further effect on realtors will be the problem of obtaining rea-
sonably priced error and omissions insurance.124 A comparison can
be made to the predicament facing the League of California Cities
which, because of the doctrine of joint and several liability, has faced
increased insurance premiums ranging from three hundred to four
hundred percent. 125 As such, the practical effect of joint and several
liability on Easton may be to force the small commercial realtor out
of business.
Despite the apparent difficulties that result from the doctrine of
joint and several liability, two areas of reform may aid the realtor.
118. Zavos, supra note 115, at 777.
119. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
120. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (quoting Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948)).
121. Id. at 582, 578 P.2d at 901, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 184. For cases affirming the hold-
ing, see Paradise Valley Hosp. v. Scholossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d 87, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1983); Klemme v. Hoag Memorial Hosp. Presbyterian, 103 Cal. App. 3d 640, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 109 (1980); Wagner v. State, 86 Cal. App. 3d 922, 150 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1978);
Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble, 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978); Adams v.
Cerritos, 79 Cal. App. 3d 957, 145 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1978); Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink
Corp., 78 Cal. App. 3d 509, 144 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1978).
122. Scholossman, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 88, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 532 (quoting Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 823, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975)).
123. The inequities are compounded when the plaintiff is negligent or when the
plaintiff's negligence is greater than the solvent defendant's negligence. This is espe-
cially true when the injury is purely economic in nature, as in most real estate cases,
and not a physical injury. For a discussion of the problems involved in a "pure" com-
parative negligence system when a defendant is insolvent, see Adams, Settlements Af-
ter Li" But is it "Fair?", 10 PAC. L.J. 729 (1979) and Miller, Extending the Fairness
Principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 14 PAc. L.J. 835, 862-63 (1983).
Nonetheless, the court's preference for a negligent plaintiff over a negligent defend-
ant can be understood. As the court stated, "[Tihe fact remains that insofar as the
plaintiff's conduct creates only risk of self-injury, such conduct, unlike that of a negli-
gent defendant, is not tortious." American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 590-91, 578 P.2d at
906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
124. See Gillies, supra note 3, at 18.
125. Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, A.B.A. J., July 1985, at 61.
First, Senate Bill 453 forbids professional insurance carriers from ex-
cluding coverage of Easton liability from their policies.126 Second,
the trend away from the strict application of joint and several liabil-
ity has manifested itself in California with the passage of Proposition
51.127
Pursuant to Proposition 51, "each defendant is liable for
noneconomic damage[, e.g., opinion and suffering type awards,] only
in direct proportion to the defendant's percentage of fault"128 How-
ever, Proposition 51 will not shield brokers from potential liability
under the doctrine of joint and several liability.129 This is because
Proposition 51 "affirms... joint and several liability for all economic
damages,"' 3 0 including property damage.13l Nonetheless, the passage
of Proposition 51 does indicate a desire for reform, and the effect of
joint and several liability, on the realtor, may be a little less onerous
in the future.'3 2
VI. CONCLUSION
From the ashes of "caveat emptor," Easton arose to establish a
cause of action based on simple negligence in residential real estate
transactions. Fortunately, Easton liability can be avoided in Califor-
nia if the guidelines in Senate Bills 453 and 1406 are followed. How-
ever, until brokers thoroughly familiarize themselves with both bills,
the following disclaimer may be used:
This house is a wreck! What isn't broken either leaks, is eaten, is infested
with wee beasties or rot. What isn't infested or leaking, sags or sways. The
wind blows constantly through the walls, like water through a sieve. In addi-
tion, the ground is subject to imminent collapse from earthquakes or buried
from landslide or inundation from any rain heavier than a light mist, rising
creeks, backed up storm drains or bursting dams.
126. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Senate Bill 453 af-
firmatively states that a buyer has the duty to use reasonable care to protect himself.
This will, in turn, cause a reduction in the amount of damages subject to joint and sev-
eral liability by the percentage of the plaintiff's own negligence. For example, if Bob
Buyer is 20 percent at fault for not observing an obvious landfill, then prospective
damages of $100,000 will be reduced by $20,000 under principles of comparative negli-
gence before joint and several liability takes effect. Therefore, if Sam Seller and
Bruce Broker are jointly liable for the damage award and Sam Seller is insolvent,
Bruce Broker will be accountable for only $80,000.
127. As of July 1985, fourteen states have either limited or abolished joint and sev-
eral liability. Granelli, supra note 125, at 61. States which have abolished joint and
several liability are New Hampshire, Vermont, Kansas, and New Mexico. Id. at 62.
States which have limited joint and several liability are Nevada, Texas, Indiana, Loui-
siana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. Id.
128. Klien and Day, Prop. 51 and The House that Tech-Bilt, CAL. LAW. 25, 26 (Nov.
1986).
129. See generally P. PEYRAT, PROPOSITION 51: A FRST ANALYSIS, (California Con-
tinuing Education of the Bar, Aug. 1986).
130. Gillies, supra note 3, at 19. See generally Klien and Day, supra note 128 at 26.
131. Klien and Day, supra note 128, at 26.
132. Id.
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Purchasing this house will subject you to severe mental distress, emotional
trauma and impotency. The end result will be that your marriage dissolves,
your children will turn on you, you'll suffer a severe religious crisis and you
may commit suicide.
ENJOY YOUR NEW HOME!!!
1 3 3
GILBERT A. PARTIDA
133. Caron, supra note 4, at 7.
APPENDIX A
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
THIS STATEMENT IS A DISCLOSURE OF THE CONDITION OF THE PROP-
ERTY IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 1102 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS OF
____, 19. IT IS NOT A WARRANTY OF ANY KIND BY THE SELLER(S) OR
ANY AGENT(S) REPRESENTING ANY PRINCIPAL(S) IN THIS TRANSACTION,
AND IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR ANY INSPECTIONS OR WARRANTIES THE
PRINCIPAL(S) MAY WISH TO OBTAIN.
I
COORDINATION WITH OTHER DISCLOSURE FORMS
This Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement is made pursuant to Section 1102 of
the Civil Code. Other statutes require disclosures, depending upon the details of the
particular real estate transaction (for example: geologic hazard zones, creative financ-
ing, and structural alterations or additions).
Substituted Disclosures: The following disclosures have or will be made in connection
with this real estate transfer, and are intended to satisfy the disclosure obligations on
this form, where the subject matter is the same:
(list all other disclosure forms to be used in connection with this transaction)
II
SELLERS INFORMATION
The Seller discloses the following information with the knowledge that even though
this is not a warranty, prospective Buyers may rely on this information in deciding
whether and on what terms to purchase the subject property. Seller hereby authorizes
any agent(s) representing any principal(s) in this transaction to provide a copy of this
statement to any person or entity in connection with any actual or anticipated sale of
the property.
THE FOLLOWING ARE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE SELLER(S) AND
ARE THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE AGENT(S), IF ANY. THIS INFORMA-
TION IS A DISCLOSURE ONLY AND IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A PART OF
ANY CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BUYER AND SELLER.
Seller __us __is not occupying the property.
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Exhaust Fan(s) in 220 Volt Wiring in
Fireplace(s) in __ Gas Hookup Insulation in
-Roof: Type: Age: - (approx.)
_Other:
Are there, to the best of your (Seller's) knowledge, any of the above that are not in
operating condition? ___Yes ___No. If yes, then describe.
(Attach additional sheets if necessary.):
B. Are you (Seller) aware of any significant defects/malfunctions in any of the fol-
lowing? -Yes ___No. If yes, check appropriate box(s) below.
__Interior Walls __Ceilings F-Moors -. Exterior Walls __Roof __Windows
___Doors __Foundation Slab(s) __Driveways _Sidewalks __Walls/Fences
_Electrical Systems Plumbing/Sewers/Septics -Other Structural Components
(Describe:
.)
If any of the above is checked, explain. (Attach additional sheets if necessary.):
C. Are you (Seller) aware of any of the following.
1. Features of the property shared in common with adjoining landowners,
such as walls, fences, and driveways, whose use or responsibility for main-
tenance may have an effect on the subject property ............... __Yes No
2. Any encroachments, easements or simple matters that may affect your in-
terest in the subject property ................................... __Yes _No
3. Room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs
made without necessary permits ................................. -Yes ___No
4. Room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations or repairs not
in compliance with building codes ............................... Yes __No
5. Landfill (compacted or otherwise) on the property or any portion thereof.
Y...............................................................  es _ N o
6. Settling, slippage, sliding, or other soil problems .................. _Yes _No
7. Flooding, drainage or grading problems .......................... Yes _No
8. Major damage to the property or any of the structures from fire, earth-
quake, floods, or landslides ...................................... Yes __No
9. Any zoning violations nonconforming uses, violations of "setback"
requirements ................................................... -Yes __ No
10. Neighborhood noise problems or other nuisances ................. Yes _No
11. Homeowners' Association which has any authority over the subject prop-
erty, CC&R's, or other deed restrictions or obligations ............. __Yes ___No
12. Any "common area" (facilities such as pools, tennis courts, walkways, or
other areas co-owned in undivided interest with others) ........... Yes __No
13. Any notices of abatement or citations against the property ...... __Yes _No
14. Any lawsuits against the seller threatening to or affecting this real
property ........................................................ Yes No
If the answer to any of these is yes, explain. (Attach additional sheets if necessary.):.
Seller certifies that the information herein is true and correct to the best of the





(To be completed only if any of the principals is represented by an agent in this
transaction.)
BASED ON THE ABOVE INQUIRY OF THE SELLER(S) AS TO THE CONDITION
OF THE PROPERTY AND BASED ON A REASONABLY COMPETENT AND DIL-
IGENT VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF THE PROP-
ERTY BY THE UNDERSIGNED AGENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH THAT
INQUIRY, AGENT STATES THE FOLLOWING:
BUYER(S) AND SELLER(S) MAY WISH TO OBTAIN PROFESSIONAL ADVICE
AND/OR INSPECTIONS OF THE PROPERTY AND TO PROVIDE FOR APPRO-
PRIATE PROVISIONS IN A CONTRACT BETWEEN BUYER(S) AND SELLER(S)






I/WE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS STATEMENT.
Seller Date Buyer Date




A REAL ESTATE BROKER IS QUALIFIED TO ADVISE ON REAL ESTATE. IF
YOU DESIRE LEGAL ADVICE CONSULT YOUR ATTORNEY.
This form is taken from S. 1406, 1985-86 Cong. Sess., Cal. Laws at
1102.6.
